Boeing admits knowing of 737 Max problem

"The question I have is just like we asked them in Reno, 'Is that all there is?' That's the biggest question", said Jon Weaks, head of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, referring to a meeting union leaders had with Boeing after the Lion Air crash.

"The software activated the AOA Disagree alert only if an airline opted for the AOA indicator", it said. Boeing believed it had made the alarm a standard feature, but later discovered it was only provided to airlines which purchased it as an optional extra.

Tajer said that even though his airline had installed the optional feature and so had a functional warning light, American Airlines pilots are still unhappy at what he described as newly discovered "misdirection" by Boeing.

Only after the crash of Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610 last November did the company issue a bulletin revealing that the light did not work as advertised.

The company's review board decided the setup was acceptable until the two alerts could be unlinked with the next planned software update for the plane's display system.

Meanwhile, in some cases domestic carriers who purchased the Max did not learn of the software glitch until after the Ethiopian Airlines crash that left 157 people dead and led to an global grounding of the fleet, according to the Wall Street Journal and carriers. Boeing says it discussed the indicator problem at that point with the Federal Aviation Administration - a year after the company knew about the problem. Boeing went on to reiterate that when it made the discovery of the faulty software in 2017, it did not warrant any recall after a thorough review.

If it had been working, the warning light would have lit up on the fatal flights of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian jets. In both cases, investigators have blamed incorrect "angle of attack" (AOA) sensor data for pitching the planes downwards to their doom. Boeing's disclosure on Sunday, however, raised fresh questions about the company's candor with regulators and airline customers.

The FAA statement then adds: "However, Boeing's timely or earlier communication with the operators would have have helped to reduce or eliminate possible confusion". "Until after Lion Air, our manuals said that worked", Weaks said. "At that time, Boeing informed the FAA that Boeing engineers had identified the software issue in 2017 and had determined per Boeing's standard process that the issue did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation". Boeing is working to fix the software that pitched the planes' noses down based on faulty sensor readings, and to provide pilots with more information about the plane's automation.

Neither the FAA or Boeing interfered with the fleet's operations until the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019.

"So you have to kind of wonder are these people really there and are they sitting around the table helping Boeing oversee its strategy?"

Before the Max returns to service, Boeing plans to issue a software update that will allow the AOA disagree light to operate as a standalone feature.

"We are being told by Boeing that the AOA Disagree Alert ... is inhibited until 400 feet above ground level", he said Sunday.